The authors use British workplace data for 1980-98 to examine whether increased human resource management (HRM) practices coincided with union decline, consistent with the hypothesis that such practices act as a substitute for unionization. Two initial analyses show no important differences between union and non-union sectors or between newer workplaces (which are likelier to be non-union) and older ones in the pattern of HRM practices over time; and the study's longitudinal analysis picks up no evidence of faster union decline in workplaces or industries that adopted HRM practices than in those that did not. Not only is the hypothesized substitution effect thus not supported, but the authors even uncover some evidence of a complementarity between unions and HRM practices. The authors conclude that increased use of HRM practices is probably not an important factor underpinning union decline in Britain. 
T he decline of trade unionism has been a feature of many countries in recent years (Verma et al. 2002) and the subject of a large body of research. Union decline has been especially strong in Britain over the past 25 years. In the late 1970s over 13 million people-or around 58% of workers-were trade union members, and wages for over 70% of workers were set by collective bargaining. Since reaching its peak in 1979, unionization (however measured) has fallen year after year, so that by 2004 less than 30% of workers were members of a trade union.
Coinciding with the decline in trade unionism has been an increase in the use of human relations practices and new forms of work organization. These are often subsumed under labels such as high-involvement, high-commitment, and high-performance management, or simply human resource management. For convenience we shall follow Fiorito (2001), a major U.S. writer on union substitution, and use the term human resource management (HRM).
HRM Substitution in Britain
The initial tendency to associate HRM practices with non-unionism was perhaps never as strong in the United Kingdom as it was in the United States, except when the practices were associated with U.S. multinationals. A lot of the discussion of HRM as an alternative to trade unions never appeared in published sources, but remained as a point of debate and speculation in conferences and seminars. HRM was often assumed to be antithetical to trade unionism, and hence much of the subtext of the debate concerned the future of industrial relations as a field (Godard and Delaney 2000) . Keith Sisson, editor of a textbook on personnel management, summed up the published sources well in his introduction to the book's second edition: "Although there are formulations which give an important place to trade unions ..., most are silent on the issues or assume a nonunion environment" (Sisson 1994:12) . From this, he wrote, we can infer that these writers regard unions as "at best unnecessary and at worst to be avoided."
At least one British commentator, however, did explicitly associate HRM with nonunionism:
"An organisation pursuing HRM," he wrote, "will almost always prefer a non-union path, emphasising individual rather than collective arrangements" (Guest 1989: 48) Yet while HRM might be associated with non-unionism, non-unionism "unfortunately" could not be equated with HRM, Guest noticeably added, as "a company may pursue non-union policies or remain fortuitously non-union without practising HRM."
The implication is that HRM is viewed as a major, if not the only effective, means of remaining non-union. Consistentwith that, HRM is inherent to the definition of union substitution in some of the U.S. literature, certainly when distinctions are made between union substitution and union suppression. When Kochan (1980:183) first made the distinction-on the basis that direct union suppression involved "hard line opposition" through, for example, the use of blacklists, while union substitution was comparatively indirect-he certainly associated substitution with the growth of personnel management. More recently, Fiorito (2001:335) similarly made the distinction on the basis that "union suppression refers to direct attacks on symptomsof'unionism' (pro-union attitudes, intentions or actions) among workers" (italics in original). Since union substitution refers to employer practices designed to offer good pay and conditions or certain kinds of employee involvement, it is often conceived as being aimed at reducing worker dissatisfaction. Given that for Fiorito the adoption of such practices does not have to be con-sciously motivated by anti-unionism, any increase in their use that acts to enhance job satisfaction and discourage unionism could be taken to be union substitution.
Nonetheless, this prejudges too much ahead of empirical research on the purported link between HRM and non-unionism. Fiorito has in fact implicitly recognized the empirical nature of the question by designing and conducting studies to test whether HRM practices do indeed act as substitutes for unions (Fiorito 2001; Fiorito et al. 1987 ).
Union Decline and the Increased Incidence of HRM Practices
The sharp union decline in Britain that dates from 1979 is by now well known. Aggregate union density showed a remarkable stability in the postwar period (at around 40-45% membership), followed by a sharp rise in the 1970s, but then an even sharper fall from the late 1970s onward. Since 1979 aggregate union density has trended downward so that, by the end of the 1990s, less than 30% of workers were members of trade unions.1
Alongside the evidence on the decline of unionization in the United Kingdom is research demonstrating that managers' increasing interest in HRM has translated into increased adoption of HRM practices. Wood and Albanese (1995:232-34 
Existing Empirical Work from Britain
To date, empirical research on the link between HRM practices and unionism has almost exclusively been based on point-intime cross-sectional analysis. Wood (1996) , examining the full range of HRM practices in U.K. manufacturing, found that unionized workplaces did not differ from nonunionized workplaces in the extent of either major HRM practices or, more generally, "high commitment management" (as judged by a composite measure) in either 1986 or 1990. Appraisal and merit pay were, however, more likely to be used in non-unionized plants, and the rate of change in high-commitment management between 1986 and 1990 was greater in nonunion plants.
Various analyses of aspects of the Workplace Industrial/Employee Relations Survey Series (of 1980, 1984, 1990, and 1998) 2001) ; cases in which managers are using HRM to undermine an existing union or at least reduce its influence; and cases in which it is being used to keep unions at bay, alongside the black hole cases. There may also be a separation of the major HRM practices from unionism, with the former focused on changing task systems, the latter on governance. This is consistent with the more general point that the relationship between HRM practices and unionism may vary across practices, as Fiorito et al. . Several of the practices that fall under these headings are ones that unions have campaigned for or that are at least consistent with their demands, the most obvious being representation, training, job security, fair selection processes, and priority given to internal recruitment. Yet this is not to deny that if management were to offer these practices independently of employee pressure, dissatisfactions that spur unionism might disappear, reducing workers' willingness to join unions. Nonetheless, some practices-especially functional flexibility in a situation of negotiated work rules andjob demarcations-may constitute substitutes for union-inspired rules and practices. As such, these may bring their own problems for workers, such as an increase in workloads, in supervisors' power, and in the scope for arbitrary management, as well as erosion of the union's power base.
The practices that most directly constitute alternatives to unions are those that can replace bargaining and voice roles. More specifically, there are two core substitutes for unions: forms of individualized pay determination such as individual bargaining or imposed merit-and performance-related pay awards, and methods of communication that purport to give workers a direct voice and avoid any third party such as a union or at least union representatives. Neither of these is likely to offer full alternatives to unions. First, under individualized pay determination, individuals negotiate without the strength of their fellow workers, and awards may be subject to the arbitrariness of managers, one of the very forces that unions were historically established to counter. Second, direct or non-union representative communication methods may offer lower levels of involvement and information-sharing, providing consultation rather than bargaining, and may not have the formal independence from management that the union has. Nonetheless, such practices remain the ones that are most important for testing the link between HRM and unionization.
Given the above considerations, the key test of union substitution is whether the increased adoption of HRM practices over time led to declines in unionism that are detectable after the analysis controls for the influence of other factors, thus allowing us to conclude that HRM systems acted to replace collective bargaining and union voice. Therefore the issue of substitutability is best explored with data on direct substitutes for unions over time. This is consistent with Fiorito's (2001:351) conclusion, based on his finding of only modest support for union substitution in a study of the effects of human resource practices on union voting intentions, that we require measures of "the use of HR practices over time" to really assess "the extent to which they have contributed to the decline of unions over recent decades." It is this crosstime approach emphasizing dynamics that we adopt in our empirical investigation.
The Study

Data Description
The data used in this paper are drawn from the British Workplace Industrial/ Employee Relations Surveys of 1980, 1984, 1990, and 1998. These are workplace-level surveys2 containing rich data on the industrial relations environment of workplaces that have been widely used by researchers to study a range of issues (see the bibliography of Millward et al. 2002 , for details of these studies). Of most relevance for our analysis is the fact that the surveys were carried out over time, as this permits us to address the question ofwhether HRM adoption paralleled union decline. The survey data contain a number of measures of union presence and of HRM practices. The crosstime angle offered by the four cross-sections is important, as we wish to see whether the rapid union decline over the period corresponded in some way with changes in the incidence of HRM practices.
Measures of Union Presence and HRM
The union data in the WIRS/WERS series have been used by many researchers, both to look at union decline (Disney, Gosling, and Machin 1994 Machin , 1995 Machin 2000 Machin , 2003 and to study the economic effects of trade unions ). The usual measure on which researchers focus is trade union recognition-whether management recognizes trade unions for collective bargaining purposes-but there are also data on workplace-level union density (the proportion of workers who are union members) and union coverage (the proportion of workers covered by collective bargaining).
The coverage of data on HRM variables became broader over the series, so that the 1998 survey covered most areas associated with HRM. Fortunately for our present concerns, the variables that have been included throughout the series (or in at least three surveys) relate to pay methods or employee voice, which are most apposite for testing the HRM/substitution hypothesis. For our empirical analysis we have therefore identified the following variables that we can observe over time (with those years that are available on a consistently defined basis in square brackets):
-the incidence of flexible pay (profit-sharing or share ownership) [1984, 1990, 1998 , trading sector workplaces only]; -the presence of aJoint Consultative Committee [1980, 1984, 1990, 1998 ]; -the presence of problem-solving groups [1990, 1998 ]; -whether team briefings occur [1984, 1990, 1998 ]; -whether there are regular meetings in which management communicates or consults with the entire work force present [1984, 1990, 1998 ]; -whether management makes systematic use of a management chain for communication 2The first three surveys were representative samples of establishments with at least 25 employees, while the 1998 survey lowered this size threshold to 10 employees. To maintain consistency over time, we restrict our analysis to workplaces with at least 25 employees. [1984, 1990, 1998 ]; -whether a suggestions scheme is in operation [1984, 1990, 1998 ]; and -whether the workplace has a personnel specialist in place [1980, 1984, 1990, 1998 ].
Analysis Strategy
We start by examining whether, in the era of union decline, HRM practices more rapidly permeated non-union workplaces than unionized workplaces. If they did, this would suggest that HRM practices do increasingly provide a voice for workers in non-union environments, and may well make trade unions anachronisms in the workplace. In other words, the implication would be that in this world of HRM, workers do not need union representation in their workplace to ensure that grievance procedures, health and safety arrangements, and other forms of involvement are there for them if required. The first approach we adopt thus considers differences over time in the use of HRM practices in the union and non-union sectors. This enables us to look at whether one can identify differential trends through time in HRM incidence between union and non-union workplaces. If HRM substitution is present, we ought to see faster increases in HRM in the non-union sector.
An observed correlation between nonunionism and HRM could, however, merely reflect a higher presence of HRM practices in newer workplaces, where unionization is especially low. That is, because HRM practices are themselves relatively new, it is plausible that they could be taken up more by newworkplaces than by established ones; and it is well established that unions have organized much less consistently in newer British workplaces than in older ones (Machin 2000 (Machin , 2003 . To ensure that we are not conflating workplace age and union status effects, our second approach therefore considers whether the incidence of HRM is higher in newer workplaces than in older ones, and thus is a stronger test than the first approach.
Finally, we consider longitudinal data on workplaces and industries and explore whether the rise of HRM has, in fact, gone hand-in-hand with union decline. While the data are for only a limited number of HRM practices, we are able to look at the dynamics of change to see whether withinworkplace or within-industry changes in unionization display any correlation with changes in HRM incidence. We do this in two ways: first, by asking whether unionized workplaces that introduced HRM practices between 1990 and 1998 saw falls in union presence relative to those that did not introduce practices; and second, by modeling changes in HRM and unionism in industries between 1980 and 1998. Table 2 reveal several patterns. First, at a given point in time, the incidence of the HRM factors tends to be higher in the union sector than in the nonunion sector. At face value, this would suggest a complementarity between unions and HRM practice. However, of most interest to us is whether there were any changes in HRM practices over the period of union decline. Table 2 shows an increased adoption of most practices in both sectors, but the results concerning increased substitution into the non-union sector are uneven (see the last two columns). Indeed, the only practice that seems to show a strong, statistically significant, faster differential increase in incidence in non-union workplaces than in union workplaces is flexible pay. As noted above, there was an eight percentage point faster increase in flexible pay incidence in the non-union sector-a statistically significant difference between sectors, as shown by the p-value of the significance test given in the final column. However, this really is the only evidence of substitution. The next nearest is a four percentage point increase in Joint Consultative Committees, with an associated p- Table 2 , it is worth adding a brief mention of the pattern of results obtained when we look at the practices jointly. Notably, there is no statistically significant differential increase in the use of multiple practices across sectors. In 1984, union sector workplaces had, on average, 2.67 of the seven HRM practices for which we have data over the 1984-98 period, and this figure rose to 3.30 by 1998; in the non-union sector the number rose from 1.85 to 2.53 over the same period. The scale of change is similar across the two sectors (a rise of.53 in the union sector and .68 in the nonunion sector), and in statistical terms one cannot reject the null hypothesis of the same change across sectors (p-value of significance test = .68).
HRM Substitution and Workplace Age Links with Workplace Age
The evidence so far has not revealed much in support of the HRM substitution thesis. In this section we consider the question another way, looking instead at the extent to which newer workplaces differentially introduced HRM practices. We adopt this approach in the light of the evidence that union decline in Britain has been driven, at least partially, by unions' failure to secure recognition and build up membership in newer workplaces (Machin 2003) . Consider the upper panel of Table 3 . Among workplaces set up before 1980, 63% recognized unions for collective bargaining, and union membership density was 58%. In stark contrast, union recognition and density were 36% and 31%, respectively, in workplaces set up in the 1980s, and only 27% and 22%, respectively, in those set up in the 1990s. Hence one sees very sharp falls in unionization rates by age of workplace. Columns (6) and (7) of Table 3 show the scale of the declines, which was very strong in statistical terms (the numbers in parentheses are standard errors).
This pattern offers promise as a means to try and identify HRM substitution. In new workplaces the absence of unions may well mean that managers used HRM to pre- Table 3 show something of a mixed pattern, but they are in part conducive to the idea that HRM practices were more likely to be present in newer workplaces. The strongest evidence in favor of this distribution is for flexible pay and for the presence of a personnel specialist. The prevalence of flexible pay was 8 percentage points higher in workplaces set up in the 1980s, and 10 percentage points higher in those set up in the 1990s, than in older workplaces; and corresponding numbers for the presence of a personnel specialist were 10 and 16 percentage points higher, respectively. Age ofworkplace gaps are less marked for some of the other measures, but most are positive, the main exception being the more traditional practice, the Joint Consultative Committee.
However, over the time period being studied there were also some important compositional changes, such as the increased incidence of smaller workplaces, and a move away from manufacturing to services. So we next present some empirical estimates of the relationship with age of workplace derived from statistical models that control for such shifts in composition. This is important because some of these HRM practices may be much more likely to be prevalent in certain workplaces. For example, larger workplaces are more likely to have a personnel specialist than are their smaller counterparts. Table 4 (as in Table  3 ) workplace age is defined as either "set up in the 1980s" or "set up in the 1990s." A number of control variables were in- 50-99, 100-199, 200-499 , 500-999, 1000+ workers relative to 25-49), female proportion, part-time proportion, part of a larger organization, private sector, industry (one-digit industry dummies), and survey year. cluded in the probit equations, which were chosen to capture the most important compositional changes in the economy over the time period under study. The variables included are establishment size (five dummy variables compared to a base of 25-49 workers), whether the establishment was part of a larger organization, the proportions of part-time and female workers, whether the workplace was in the private sector, and a set of one-digit industry dummies.
Statistical Estimates
The upper panel of Table 4 reconfirms what is known from earlier work, revealing union recognition to be around 10 to 12 percentage points lower in workplaces set up in the 1980s or 1990s conditional on the factors measuring compositional change. This is a sizeable effect, and the same is true for union density, as given in the second specification of the upper panel, where 1980s and 1990s effects are very similar indeed.
The lower panel (B) of Table 4 considers the HRM practices. It is immediately striking that the inclusion of the controls is much more important for the HRM regressions than for the union ones. In statistical terms, all of the correlations with workplace age are wiped out in the statistical models. Unlike for union decline, the changing composition ofworkplaces seems to fully explain the link between the incidence of HRM practices and workplace age. This, like the evidence reported in the previous section, seems inconsistent with 50-99, 100-199, 200-499 , 500-999, 1000+ workers relative to 25-49), female proportion, part-time proportion, part of a larger organization, private sector, industry (one-digit industry dummies), and survey year.
HRM substitution taking place during the period of union decline in Britain.
Non-Union/Union Differences
Before accepting that conclusion, however, we need to examine whether or not predominantly new non-union workplaces were increasingly introducing HRM practices. We do so in Table 5 , which reports the marginal effects of workplace age on the incidence of various HRM incidence measures derived from probit equations estimated separately for union and nonunion workplaces. HRM substitution related to workplace age predicts that one should see more of a positive new workplace effect in non-union workplaces. The table therefore presents coefficient estimates associated with indicators of whether workplaces were set up in the 1980s and 1990s for the union sector (columns 3 and 4), analogous effects for the non-union sector (in columns 5 and 6), and then nonunion/union gaps (columns 7 and 8). Table 5 shows that the positive nonunion/union gaps that HRM substitution would predict are rarely seen. In fact, none of the non-union/union differences in columns (7) and (8) are positive and statistically significant, and many are actually negative. This result reflects the fact that a number of the non-union effects are negative and they rarely are more positive than the union effects. None of this supports the HRM/union substitution thesis.
Longitudinal Changes in the Union-HRM Relation
Our analysis so far rejects the idea that HRM substitution, in its orthodox sense of substituting between union and non-union sectors, has occurred. But one more possibility remains: that where the use of HRM has risen within the union sector, it weak- Table 6 shows the within-establishment change in union density broken down by the change, or lack thereof, in the status of each HRM practice (practice newly introduced; practice removed; or no change). The hypothesis that HRM substitution weakened unions within the union sector implies larger falls in union density in workplaces that introduced an HRM practice than in those that did not.
The results in Table 6 are not in line with that prediction. For example, although workplaces that introduced aJCC between 1990 and 1997 saw union density fall by 9 percentage points, density also fell by 9 percentage points in workplaces that removed aJCC and by 6 percentage points in workplaces where JCC status remained unaltered. The same pattern is true of Flexible Pay. While density fell by 9 percentage points in workplaces that introduced Flexible Pay, it also fell by 10 percentage points in those that abandoned the practice and by 6 percentage points in workplaces with no change in their use of flexible pay.
The results remain robust in regressions with the change in union density as the dependent variable and control variables including the 1990 to 1997 change in employment, the proportion of manual workers, and a set of one-digit industry dummies, as shown in Table 7 . Overall, there seems to be little evidence of faster union decline in workplaces that introduced HRM practices in the 1990s.
Another way of using the WIRS/WERS data to study longitudinal changes is to aggregate the workplace data in the four surveys of 1980, 1984, 1990, and 1998 to industry level so as to study industry-level changes in the relationship between unionization and HRM incidence over time. To perform that exercise, we aggregated the data to 44 industries that we track over time. Table 8 reports the coefficients on various HRM practices from a regression in which the proportion of workplaces in the industry with recognized unions was the dependent variable and industry fixed effects were included in some of the equations. Where industry fixed effects were controlled for, one can infer the relationship between within-industry changes in unionization and within-industry changes in HRM practices. We can use the fixed effect equations to assess the following question about HRM substitution: in industries where HRM incidence went up by more, did unionization fall by more? Evidence confirming this would be a negative coefficient on the HRM measures in the industry fixed effects specifications reported in Table 8 . Table 8 is structured to show results that enter the HRM incidence measures separately (in columns 1-7, where no controls are included, and in columns 9-15, where controls are included) and all together (in column 8, without controls, and in column Notes: All specifications include controls for change in log(employment), change in proportion manual, and a set of one-digit industry dummies; standard errors in parentheses.
16, with controls)
. The pattern of results shows that while there are a few negative coefficients, these are the exception to the rule, and only one of them is statistically significant (for Regular Meetings with Senior Management when no control variables are entered in column 4). In the specifications with control variables in the lower panel of Table 8 there is no evidence of union decline being faster where HRM incidence increased. As such, neither set of longitudinal data considered in this section supports the hypothesis of HRM substitution.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have considered one of the key hypotheses of modern industrial relations, namely that unionism has been replaced by alternative non-union forms of voice and communication through the adoption of HRM practices. Were such HRM substitution taking place, one would expect to see a swifter introduction of HRM practices in non-union workplaces than in unionized workplaces; certainly one would expect to find the presence of these practices and the absence of a recognized trade union, in the new kinds of workplaces being set up in recent years. A finding of a more rapid diffusion of HRM into nonunion workplaces would also cast doubt on the argument, expressed by those encouraging unions to embrace HRM, that HRM practices and unions can be complementary. Moreover, were such a pattern a longterm trend, it would seemingly contradict the "mutual gains" argument (Kochan and Osterman 1994) that HRM's performance effects will be enhanced when unions are present.
Our empirical investigation, using workplace data from the Workplace Industrial/ Employee Relations series of surveys in Britain between 1980 and 1998, uncovers no evidence to support the hypothesis ofHRM/ union substitution, at least operating in the commonly accepted and frequently stated way, with HRM replacing unions. This finding emerges from several empirical strategies. First we compared changes over time in the incidence of HRM practices across union and non-union sectors, and found little difference between sectors. Second, we asked whether newer workplaces (because these have been shown to be more likely to be non-union) have experienced differentially faster HRM incidence. We were unable to find much evidence of such a pattern, and certainly we found no evidence of statistically significant union/nonunion differences. Third, an analysis of longitudinal changes also failed to yield any evidence of faster union decline in workplaces or industries with faster adoption of HRM practices. Overall, one can only conclude that HRM substitution does not seem to be a very important factor in explaining trade union decline in Britain.4
However, we do not know how generalizable these findings are to other countries. It is sometimes argued that in Britain managers have not fully embraced human re- It may also be that stronger substitution effects would be evident where management's attitudes toward unions are more markedly negative than in the United Kingdom. Some observers cite the United States as a decidedly union-unfriendly environment, and claim that HRM is being used more overtly there than in the United Kingdom as a form of union suppression. However, there have certainly been enough genuflections to the co-existence of unions and HRM practices in other countries (for example, Kochan et al. 1986; Weitbrecht 2003) to suggest that were this study replicated outside Britain, similar results might be found. Moreover, we have little evidence to indicate that strong anti-union employers, particularly in low-wage sectors of the economy, are any more likely to use any employee involvement, performancerelated pay, or sophisticated personnel methods than are their counterparts in the United Kingdom.
Its generalizability aside, this study has implications for the wider debate about industrial relations as a field of study, which has been largely fueled by events in Anglo Such matters remain firmly on the agenda for future research.
